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Abstract—We consider a scenario where N users try to
access a common base station. Associated with each user is its
channel state and a finite queue which varies with time. Each
user chooses his power and the admission control variable in
a dynamic manner so as to maximize his expected throughput.
The throughput of each user is a function of the actions and
states of all users. The scenario considers the situation where
each user knows his channel and buffer state but is unaware of
the states and actions taken by the other users. We consider the
scenario when each user is saturated (i.e., always has a packet to
transmit) as well as the case when each user is unsaturated. We
formulate the problem as a Markov game and show connections
with strategic form games. We then consider various throughput
functions associated with the multiple user channel and provide
algorithms for finding these equilibria.
Keywords: Multiple access channel, Stochastic games, Stationary
policies, Strategic form games, Nash equilibria, Potential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a tremendous growth of wireless com-
munication systems over the last few years. The success of
wireless systems is primarily due to the efficient use of their
resources. The users are able to obtain their quality of service
efficiently in a time varying radio channel by adjusting their
own transmission powers. Distributed control of resources is
an interesting area of study since its alternative involves high
system complexity and large infrastructure due the presence
of a central controller.
Noncooperative game theory [1] is a natural tool to de-
sign and analyze wireless systems with distributed control
of resources. Scutari et al. [3], [4] analyzed competitive
maximization of transmission rate and mutual information
on the multiple access channel subject to power and other
constraints. Heikkinen [5] analyzed distributed power control
problems via potential games while Lai et al.[2] applied game
theoretic framework to resource allocation problem in fading
multiple access channel.
Altman et al. [6] studied the problem of maximizing
throughput of saturated users (a user always has a packet
to transmit) who have a Markov modelled channel and are
subjected to power constraints.They considered both the cen-
tralized scenario where the base station chooses the transmis-
sion power levels for all users as well as the decentralized
scenario where each user chooses its own power level based
on the condition of its radio channel. Altman et al. [7]
later considerd the problem of maximizing the throughput
of users in a distributed manner subject to both power and
buffer constraints. The decentralized scenario in [6] while the
distributed resource allocation problem in [7] was analyzed as
constrained Markov games with independent state information,
i.e., no user knows other user’s state. The proof of existence of
the equilibrium policies for such games was given in [8]. An
algorithm which guaranteed convergence to the equilibrium
policies for two users for any throughput function of the
two users and an algorithm which guaranteed convergence to
the equilibrium policies for N users when their throughput
functions are identical were provided in [9].
Our work is closely related to the above mentioned work.
When restricted to the objective functions in [6], [7] our
problem is exactly the same however we present an alternative
view of constrained Markov games with independent state
information. With this view we connect the theory to strategic
form games [10]. The existence of equilibrium policies follows
directly from this viewpoint. This includes both the saturated
as well as the unsaturated scenario considered in [6] and
[7] respectively. We also show that the algorithm which
guaranteed convergence to the equilibrium policies for N users
can be extended to cases where the throughput functions of
the users may be different.
Besides presenting an unified view of both the saturated
as well as the unsaturated problem, we also consider the case
where the base station uses a successive interfence cancellation
rather than a regular matched filter. Here we formulate both
the non-cooperative and the cooperative (team problem) setup
and find the equilibria for both the problems.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we present
the system model for both the saturated (no buffer constraints)
and the unsaturated (both buffer and power constraints) sce-
nario. In Section III we setup the problem as a constrained
Markov game with independent state information and define
the so called equivalent strategic form game. Here we provide
a proof of existence of equilibrium policies and define the
idea of a pure strategy and potential function for Markov
games. In Section IV we consider various throughput functions
associated with the multiple access channel. In Section V
we develop algorithms to compute these equilibrium policies.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a scenario where a set N = {1, · · · , N} of
users access the base station through a channel simultaneously.
Time is divided into slots. The channel for user i is modelled
as an ergodic Markov chain ki[n] taking values from a finite
index set Ki = {0, 1, 2, · · · , kim}. The channel gain for user
i in index ki is hi(ki) where function hi : Ki 7−→ [0 1]. We
assume hi(0) = 0.
The transition probabilty of user i going from channel index
ki to k
′
i is Pkik′i . We assume that in each time slot each
user knows his channel index perfectly but does not know the
channel index of the other users. Each user has a set of power
indexes Li = {0, 1, 2, · · · , lim} where lim is the largest power
index. The power invested by user i at time n is given by the
function pi : Li 7−→ R with the property that pi(0) = 0, i.e.,
there is no power invested by user i at power index li = 0.
Let li[n] represent the power index followed by user i.
For the unsaturated case each user has a queue of finite
length qmi . Denote Qi = {0, 1, 2, · · · , qim}. Let γi[n] packets
arrive in the queue at time slot n from the higher layers where
{γi[n], n ≥ 0} are independent and identically distributed (iid)
with distribution τ . In each time slot a user may transmit
atmost one packet from its queue if it is not empty. Let
di[n] ∈ Di = {0, 1} be the admission control variable for
user i where di[n] = 1 denotes accepting all packets from
the upper layer and di[n] = 0 denotes rejecting all packets.
The incoming packets are accepted untill the buffer is full, the
remaining packets are dropped. We assume that a user has no
information about the queues of other users. If qi[n] and wi[n]
denote the number of packets in the queue and the number of
departures from the buffer in slot n then the queue dynamics
are given as,
qi[n+ 1] = min([qi[n] + di[n]γi[n]− wi[n]]
+, qim). (1)
In time slot n the state xi[n] and the action ai[n] of user i
is defined as,
xi[n] = (ki[n], qi[n]) , ai[n] = (li[n], ci[n]). (2)
The set of states Xi and the set of actions Ai of user i are
denoted as Xi = Ki×Qi and Ai = Li×Di respectively. The
set of states (actions) other than that of user i is denoted as
X−i (A−i) while the set of all states (actions) of all users is
denoted as X (A) respectively. In the following we will present
the details for the unsaturated case and then comment briefly
for the saturated case.
A. Instantaneous throughput and cost for user i:
The throughput obtained by user i is given by the function
ti : K× L 7−→ R+ satisfying ti(k, l) = 0 if ki = 0 or li = 0
where K =
∏N
i=1 Ki and A =
∏N
i=1 Ai. This implies that
the throughput obtained by user i is 0 if the channel is very
bad or there is no power invested by the user. Note that the
throughput of user i depends on the global channel index k
and global power index l of all users. We define the throughput
(ti) and the cost (cji ) of user i at time n as,
ti(x[n], a[n]) = ti(k[n], 1{qi[n] 6=0} · li[n]; i ∈ N), (3)
c1i (x[n], a[n]) = pi(ki[n]), c
2
i (x[n], a[n]) = qi[n], (4)
where 1A represents the indicator function and is 1 if event A
is true. We observe that there is a power cost and a queuing
cost for user i due to stringent delay requirements which have
to be met by the user.
B. Transition probabilty under each action:
We define the transition probability Pxiaix′i of user i going
from state xi to state x
′
i under the action ai as,
P
xiaix
′
i
= P
kik
′
i
· P
qiaiq
′
i
, (5)
where Pqiaiq′i is the transition probability of user i going from
state qi to state q
′
i under action ai.
C. Saturated system:
In the saturated system each user always has a packet to
transmit at each time. Thus there is only a power cost for every
user. Th state, action and transition probability of user i get
modified as, xi[n] = ki[n], ai[n] = li[n],and Pxiaix′i = Pkik′i
while the instantaneous throughput and cost for user i are
ti(x[n], a[n]) = ti(k[n], l[n]) and c1i (x[n], a[n]) = pi(ki[n])
respectively.
D. Stationary policies:
Let Mi(G) be the set of probabilty measures over a set G. A
stationary policy for user i is a function ui : Xi 7−→Mi(Ai).
The value ui(ai|xi) represents the probability of user i taking
action ai when it is in state xi. We denote the set of stationary
policies for user i as Ui and the set of all stationary multi-
policies as U =
∏N
i=1 Ui. The set of stationary multipolicies
of all users other than user i is denoted as U−i.
E. Expected time-average rate, costs and constraints:
Let x0 := x[0] represent the initial state of all users.
Given a stationary multipolicy u for all players, P x0u denotes
the distribution of the stochastic process (x[n], a[n]). The
expectation due to this distribution is denoted as Ex0u . We now
define the time-average expected rate as,
Ti(u) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
E
x0
u (ti(x[n], a[n])). (6)
where the expected time average costs are subject to con-
straints,
Cki (ui) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
E
x0
ui
(cki (x[n], a[n])) ≤ C
k
i . (7)
where C1i = P i and C
2
i = Qi. In case of the saturated scenario
k = 1 otherwise k ∈ {1, 2}. A policy ui is called i−feasible
if it satisfies Cki (ui) ≤ C
k
i ∀ k and is called feasible if it is
i-feasible for all users i ∈ N.
III. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
Each user chooses a stationary policy ui ∈ Ui so as to
maximize his expected average reward Ti(u). However Ti(u)
depends on the stationary policy of other users also leading to
a noncooperative game. We denote the above formulation as
a constrained Markov game [8], [11],
Γcmg =
[
N, (Xi), (Ai), (Pi), (ti), (cki ), (Cki )
]
,
where the elements of the above tuple are as defined previ-
ously. Let [u−i, vi] denote the multipolicy where, users k 6= i
use stationary policy uk while user i uses policy vi. We now
define the Constrained Nash Equillibrium (CNE).
Definition 1: A multipolicy u ∈ U is called a CNE if for
each player i ∈ N and for any vi ∈ Ui such that [u−i, vi] is
feasible,
Ti(u) ≥ Ti(u−i, vi). (8)
A i−feasible policy ui is called an optimal response of
player i against a multipolicy u−i of other users if for any
other i−feasible policy vi , (13) holds.
In this paper we limit ourselves to stationary CNE as against
general history dependent Nash equilibria. These are easy to
implement and are usually the subject of study. It is shown in
[8] that stationary Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria in the
general class of policies also although may only be a proper
subset.
A. Calculation of optimal response
Denote the transition probability of user i going from state
xi to state yi under the policy ui as,
Pxiuiyi =
∑
ai∈Ai
ui(ai|xi)Pxiaiyi . (9)
Define the immediate reward for user i, when user i has state
xi and takes action ai and other users use multipolicy u−i as,
Ri(xi, ai) =
∑
(x−i,a−i)
[
∏
l 6=i
ul(al|xl)pi
ul(xl)]ti(x, a), (10)
where piul(xl) is the steady state probability of user l being
in state xl when it uses policy ul.
Given the stationary policy ui ∈ Ui define the occupation
measure as,
zi(xi, ai) = pi
ui(xi) · ui(ai|xi). (11)
The occupation measure zi(xi, ai) for user i is the steady-state
probability of the user being in state xi ∈ Xi and using action
ai ∈ Ai. Given the occupation measure zi the stationary policy
ui is:
ui(ai|xi) =
zi(xi, ai)∑
ai∈Ai zi(xi, ai)
, (xi, ai) ∈ Xi × Ai. (12)
Then the time-average expected rate and costs under the
multipolicy u are:
Ti(u) =
∑
(xi,ai)
Ri(xi, ai)zi(xi, ai), (13)
Cki (ui) =
∑
(xi,ai)
cki (xi, ai)zi(xi, ai). (14)
B. Best response of player i
Let all users other than user i use the multipolicy u−i. Then
user i has an optimal stationary best response policy which is
independent of the initial state x0 [8]. Let the set of optimal
stationary policies of user i be denoted as BR(u−i). We can
compute the elements of this set from the following Linear
program:
Find z∗i = [z∗i (xi, ai)], (xi, ai) ∈ Xi × Ai that maximizes:
Ti(u) =
∑
(xi,ai)
Ri(xi, ai)zi(xi, ai), (15)
subject to∑
(xi,ai)
[1yi(xi)− Pyiaixi ]zi(xi, ai) = 0, ∀yi ∈ Xi, (16)
Cki (ui) =
∑
(xi,ai)
cki (xi, ai)zi(xi, ai) ≤ C
k
i , ∀ k ∈ {1, 2},
(17)∑
(xi,ai)
zi(xi, ai) = 1, zi(xi, ai) ≥ 0, ∀(xi, yi) ∈ Xi × Yi.
(18)
Note that the above Linear program can be modified for the
saturated scenario simply by choosing k = 1. The Linear
program for the saturated scenario can be presented in a much
simpler form [6]. The constraints (21 − 23) are referred in
matrix form as Aius · zi ≤ bus.
C. Equivalent Strategic form game:
In this section we will show that the above Markov game
is equivalent to a usual strategic form (nonstochastic) game.
We will use this equivalence to show existence of the CNE
and also provide algorithms to find them and show their
convergence.
Define a Strategic form game ΓE =
〈
N, {Vi}i∈N, {ri}i∈N
〉
where Vi := {1, 2, · · · , vmi }. Each point vi ∈ Vi corresponds
to the endpoint [zi(xi, ai)]; (xi, ai) ∈ Xi × Ai of the poly-
hedron formed due to constraints Aius · zi ≤ bus and will be
denoted as vi := [vi(xi, ai)]; (xi, ai) ∈ Xi × Ai. The utility
function ri : V 7−→ R where V =
∏
i∈N Vi is defined as,
ri(v) = ri(v1, v2, · · · , vN ) :=
∑
(xi,ai)
Rvi (xi, ai)vi(xi, ai),
(19)
where
Rvi (xi, ai) :=
∑
(xi,ai)
∏
l 6=i
vl(xl, al)ti(x, a). (20)
Let λi be a mixed strategy for player i. Denote the set of mixed
strategies of player i as ∆(Vi). The expected utility of player
i when all players use strategy tuple λ = (λ1, λ2, · · · , λN )
is given as ri(λ) := Eλ(ri) where Eλ(.) denotes expectation
with respect to the global mixed strategy λ. Define the set of
optimal strategies for player i, when other players use strategy
λ−i as,
BR(λ−i) =
{
λ∗i : λ
∗
i ∈ argmaxλiri(λi, λ−i)
}
. (21)
D. Existence of Nash Equillibrium
The following proposition establishes a connection between
any global multipolicy u for the constrained Markov game
Γcmg and some global mixed strategy λ in the equivalent
strategic form game ΓE .
Proposition 1: There exist a u∗i ∈ BR(u−i) given any
multipolicy u−i of players other than i if and only if there
exist λ−i for players other than i and a λ∗i ∈ BR(λ−i) such
that Ti(u∗i , u−i) = ri(λ∗i , λ−i)
Proof: Refer to [11].
The existence of CNE for the constrained Markov game
Γcmg follows from the above proposition.
Theorem 1: There exist a CNE for the Constrained Markov
game Γcmg .
Proof: There exist a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium for the equivalent strategic form game ΓE [1], let
it be denoted by λ∗. It follows then, that ri(λ∗i , λ∗−i) ≥
ri(λi, λ
∗
−i), ∀ λi, ∀ i ∈ N. From proposition 1 we can find
equivalent u for λ such that Ti(u∗i , u∗−i) = ri(λ∗i , λ∗−i) ≥
ri(λi, λ
∗
−i) = Ti(ui, u
∗
−i), ∀ ui ∈ Ui, ∀ i ∈ N. This proves
that u∗ is a CNE.
E. Potential Games
We first define the idea of a pure strategy and pure startegy
Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for the constrained Markov game
Γcmg.
Definition 2: A policy ui for player i is called a pure policy
or pure strategy of the constrained Markov game Γcmg if the
mixed strategy λ corresponding to this policy is a pure strategy.
We say that a constrained Markov game Γcmg has a PSNE if
the equivalent startegic form game has a PSNE.
Definition 3: A strategic form game Γ is called a potential
game if there exists a function r : V 7−→ R such that ∀ i ∈ N,
r1i (vi, v−i)− r
1
i (vˆi, v−i) =
(
r(vi, v−i)− r(vˆi, v−i)
)
∀ vi, vˆi ∈
Vi, ∀ v−i ∈ V−i. Γcmg is a potential game if the
corresponding ΓE is a potential game.
Consider the class of strategic form games,
Ξ :=
(
Γ(k) =
〈
N, {Li}i∈N, {ti(k)}i∈N
〉
: k ∈ K
)
(22)
Lemma 1: If Γ(k) is a potential game for each k ∈ K, then
the constrained Markov game Γcmg is a potential game.
Proof: Refer to [11].
Refer to an example in [11].
IV. THROUGHPUT FUNCTIONS
The base station may use a regular matched filter or a
successive interference cancellation (SIC) filter. We assume
that each user is aware of the filter adopted at the base station
to decode their respective transmissions. Any of the two cases
results in different throughput functions for the users which
we characterize in the subsequent subsections.
A. Regular matched filter
When the base station uses a regular matched filter the
received packet of any user is decoded by treating the signals
of other users as noise. In this case, the throughput functions
for user i is,
tini (k, l) = log2
(
1 +
hi(ki)pi(li)
N0 +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i hj(kj)pj(lj)
)
. (23)
Note that tini (k, l) is an upper bound for the throughput of
user i. On the other hand the users may want to maximize
the aggregrated throughput in a decentralized manner. In this
case the joint objective function when they use action a ∈ A
at state x ∈ X is,
ts(k, l) =
N∑
i=1
tini (k, l). (24)
The interference cancellation Markov game is Γcmg with
ti = t
in
i and the sum throughput game is Γcmg with ti = ts.
The interference canccellation Markov game and the sum
throughput Markov game are denoted as Γincmg and Γscmg
respectively. These throughput functions were considered in
[7], [6].
B. Successive Interference Cancellation
When the base station uses a successive interference can-
cellation filter it decodes the data of users in a predefined
order at each time slot. Given an ordering scheme on the the
set of users N, the received packet of a user i is decoded
after cancelling out the decoded transmission of other users
lying below user i in the predefined order from the received
transmission. We assume perfect cancellation of the decoded
signal from the received transmission [7].
We first show how to choose the decoding order for each
time slot. We define the ”Endpoint SIC schemes” where the
decoding order is fixed for all time slots. Now using the
latter we define the ”Randomized SIC schemes” where the
decoding order for each time slot is chosen randomly from
some distribution. We assume that the distribution is known
to all users but they do not know the decoding order at each
time slot.
1) Endpoint SIC schemes: Here the decoding order is same
for each time slot n. Given the set of users N define the m-
th permutation set of N as the ordered set σN (m) where m
represents one of the possible N ! permutation. Let Bi(m)
denote the set of players who are indexed above user i in
the set σN (m). We define the m-th utility function of user i
as,
tmi (k, l) = log2
(
1 +
hi(ki)pi(li)
N0 +
∑
j∈Bi(m) hj(kj)pj(lj)
)
. (25)
The above utility function for player i indicates that all users
indexed below user i in the set σN (m) are decoded before user
i and their signal is cancelled out from the received signal,
after which, user i signal is decoded. The m-th endpoint SIC
Markov game is Γcmg with ti = tmi ∀ i ∈ N and is denoted
as Γmcmg.
2) Randomized SIC schemes: Here the decoding order is
chosen at each time slot n with a probability. Though each
user knows the probability distribution at each time slot n, he
does not know the exact decoding order. If probabilty mass
function α = {α(m)} over the set N! = {1, 2, · · · , N !} is
chosen then the utility function of user i as,
tαi (k, l) =
N !∑
m=1
α(m)tmi (k, l). (26)
The α randomized SIC Markov game is Γcmg with ti = tαi
∀ i ∈ N and is denoted as Γαcmg. Note that the randomizations
α such that α(m) = 1 for some m corresponds to the endpoint
game Γmcmg. In the next subsection we find randomizations α,
for which Γαcmg has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
3) Randomized games with PSNE: In this sction we con-
struct randomizations α for which the resulting randomized
games have PSNE’s. Take a partition P1, P2, · · · , Pk of the
set N where 1 ≤ k ≤ N . Let s(pa) = P1, P2, · · · , Pk denote
this particular partition of the set N where pa indexes this
particular partition of the set N.
Let s(pa, pe) = (Pe1Pe2 · · ·Pek) denote the ordered
set formed by the pe-th permutation of the partitions
P1, P2, · · · , Pk. Note that 1 ≤ pe ≤ k!. Define the Support
set S(pa, pe) as,
S(pa, pe) :={
m : σN (m) = σPe1(m1)σPe2(m2) · · ·σPek(mk)
∀ 1 ≤ m1 ≤ |Pe1|! , · · · , 1 ≤ mk ≤ |Pek|!
}
.
where σG(m) refers to the m-th permutation of the set G. The
set S(pa, pe) contains all the permutations m for which the
randomization α (to be defined next) has a positive value,
i.e α(m) > 0 ∀ m ∈ S(pa, pe). We now define the
randomization α(pa, pe) as,
α(m) =
{ 1
|P1|!|P2|!···|Pk|!
; m ∈ S(pa, pe)
0 ; otherwise. (27)
The following example shows the construction for N =
{1, 2, 3}
Example 1: N = {1, 2, 3}. The permutation sets of N are
σN (1) = (1, 2, 3), σN (2) = (1, 3, 2), σN (3) = (2, 1, 3),
σN (4) = (2, 3, 1), σN (5) = (3, 1, 2) and σN (6) = (3, 2, 1).
The possible partitions of the set N are s(1) =
{1}, {2}, {3}, s(2) = {1, 2}, {3}, s(3) = {1, 3}, {2}, s(4) =
{3, 2}, {1} and s(5) = {1, 2, 3}. The ordered set formed
due to the corresponding permutations of the partitions are
s(1, 1) = ({1}{2}{3}), s(1, 2) = ({1}{3}{2}), s(1, 3) =
({2}{1}{3}), s(1, 4) = ({2}{3}{1}), s(1, 5) = ({3}{1}{2}),
s(1, 6) = ({3}{2}{1}), s(2, 1) = ({1}{2, 3}), s(2, 2) =
({2, 3}{1}), s(3, 1) = ({2}{1, 3}), s(3, 2) = ({1, 3}{2}),
s(4, 1) = ({3}{1, 2}), s(4, 2) = ({1, 2}{3}) and s(5) =
({1, 2, 3}).
The support sets resulting from the above ordered sets are
S(1, 1) = {1}, S(1, 2) = {2}, S(1, 3) = {3}, S(1, 4) = {4},
S(1, 5) = {5}, S(1, 6) = {6}, S(2, 1) = {1, 2}, S(2, 2) =
{4, 6}, S(3, 1) = {3, 4}, S(3, 2) = {2, 5}, S(4, 1) = {5, 6},
S(4, 2) = {1, 3} and S(5, 1) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} The above
support set lead to the following randomizations:
TABLE I
RANDOMIZATIONS WITH PSNE
α(pa, pe) α(1) α(2) α(3) α(4) α(5) α(6)
α(1, 1) 1 0) 0 0 0 0
α(1, 2) 0 1 0 0 0 0
α(1, 3) 0 0 1 0 0 0
α(1, 4) 0 0 0 1 0 0
α(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 1 0
α(1, 6) 0 0 0 0 0 1
α(2, 1) 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0
α(2, 2) 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
α(3, 1) 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 0
α(3, 2) 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0
α(4, 1) 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2
α(4, 2) 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
α(5, 1) 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
The next theorem shows that the randomizations constructed
in this section lead to games which have PSNE’s.
Theorem 2: Any Markov game Γαcmg with α = α(pa, pe)
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Refer to [11].
C. Sum Capacity utility function
We define the sum capacity utility function as,
tsc(k, l) = log2
(
1 +
∑N
i=1 hi(ki)pi(li)
N0
)
. (28)
For any probabilty distribution α we have,
N∑
i=1
tαi (k, l) = t
sc(k, l).
We can interpret the sum capacity utility function as the
aggregrated sum throughput that each user maximizes in
a decentralized manner when the base station is using a
SIC decoder. The Sum capacity Markov game is Γcmg with
ti = t
sc ∀ i ∈ N and is denoted as Γsccmg.
V. ALGORITHMS
In this section we give the algorithms to compute the
CNE for the Markov games Γincmg, Γsccmg, Γscmg and Γαcmg
whenever α = α(pa, pe) for some partition s(pa) of N and
permutation pe of the partition sets. Algorithm 1 is used to
compute the Nash equilibrium for the first three Markov games
while algorithm 2 is used to compute the equilibrium for the
randomized game Γαcmg. Note that algorithm 1 was considered
in [6] and its proof for identical interest throughput functions
(i.e., Γscmg) was also given. We extend the proof for Γscmg.
Algorithm 1
Initialize multipolicy u0 ∈ U
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
Compute uki ∈ BR(u−i) by solving the LP
using the simplex algorithm where u−i =
(uk1 , u
k
2 , · · · , u
k
i−1, u
k−1
i , · · · , u
k−1
N ).
if Ti(uki , u−i)=Ti(uk−1i , u−i) then
then the updated value uki := uk−1i
end if
end for
if uk = uk−1 then
stop, else go to step 2
end if
uk is the CNE
We define the restriction of Γcmg which is used in algorithm
2. Given any set S ⊆ N of users and policy u0i for all
i ∈ N/S, we define the restriction of Γcmg on the set S as the
constrained Markov game with the set S of users participating
in the game Γcmg while the users i ∈ N/S use the predefined
policy u0i . We denote the restricted game as Γcmg(S).
Let s(pa, pe) = Pe1Pe2 · · ·Pek denote the ordered set
formed by the pe-th permutation of the partition s(pa) =
P1, P2, · · · , Pk. We compute the PSNE for the game Γαcmg
induced by the partition pa and permutation pe.
Algorithm 2
Initialize multipolicy u0 ∈ U
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k do
if user i ∈ Pel where l < j then
Set ui = u∗i
end if
if user i ∈ Pel where l > j then
Set ui = u0i
end if
Compute uki for all i ∈ Pej by restricting algorithm 1
on the restricted Markov game Γcmg(Pej).
Set u∗i = uki for all i ∈ Pej .
end for
u∗i , i ∈ N is the required PSNE.
The convergence of algorithms 1 and 2 is proved in [11].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The channel model considered is the BF-FSMC model
[7]: The channel transition probabilities are P0,0 = 1/2,
P0,1 = 1/2, Pki
m
,ki
m
−1 = 1/2, Pki
m
,ki
m
= 1/2 ;Pki,ki = 1/3,
Pki,ki−1 = 1/3, Pki,ki+1 = 1/3 (1 ≤ ki ≤ k
i
m − 1). The
channel gain and the power function are hi = ki/(kmi ) and
pi = li respectively.
The following parameters are fixed for all user: kmi = 3,
lmi = 5, q
m
i = 10, P i = 2 and Qi = 5. γi[n] has a Poisson
distribution with rate .3 and N0 = 1. The throughput obtained
at the equilibria for the various games are tabulated in Table
II in the user order {1, 2, 3}. Note that the randomized game
α(2, 1) has multiple equilibria. Please refer to [11] for the
optimal policies. :
TABLE II
OPTIMAL USER THROUGHPUT
Game / System Model Saturated Unsaturated
Γincmg .5263, .5263, .5263 .4649, .4649, .4649
Γαcmg
α = α(1, 1) 1.0644, .6969, .5068 .6949, .5649, .4649
Γαcmg
α = α(4, 2) .8836, .8836, .5082 .6299, .6299, .4649
Γαcmg
α = α(5, 1) .7566, .7566, .7566 .5749, .5749, .5749
Γαcmg 1.0644, .6035, .5987
α = α(2, 1) 1.0644, .5987, .6035 .6949, .5149, .5149
Γscmg 1.6139 1.3959
Γsccmg 2.2789 1.7246
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered decentralized scheduling of a Wireless
channel by multiple users. The users may be saturated or
unsaturated. The decoder at the base station may employ
a matched filter or successive interfernce cancellation. The
users know only their own channel states. The system is
modelled as a constrained Markov game with independent
state information. We have proved the existence of equilibrium
policies and provided algorithms to find these policies. For
this, we first convert the Markov game into an equivalent
strategic form game.
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